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TRIBAL AUTHORITY TO ZONE 
NONMEMBER FEE LAND USING THE FIRST 
MONTANA EXCEPTION: A GAME OF 
CHECKERS TRIBES CAN WIN 
Alexis E. Applegate* 
Abstract: The modern Congress and executive branch generally recog-
nize that American Indian tribes retain their inherent sovereign authority 
over people and property within Indian Country unless Congress previ-
ously acted to limit that authority. The Supreme Court, however, has in-
crementally departed from this recognition of inherent sovereign author-
ity by implementing limits on tribal authority over nonmembers and 
nonmember land. These impediments began with the divestiture of tribal 
jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmembers and expanded to 
limitations on tribal authority to assert civil regulatory and adjudicative 
jurisdiction over nonmembers. The Supreme Court first applied this the-
ory of implicit divestiture on limitations of tribal civil regulatory authority 
in the landmark case Montana v. United States. This limitation on tribal 
sovereignty continues to severely impact the ability of tribal governments 
to implement successful zoning and comprehensive land use plans within 
reservation boundaries. This Note accepts the status of the law for the 
time being and offers advice and suggestions for tribes to use the lan-
guage of these decisions to develop consensual relationships with non-
member fee land owners in the creation of comprehensive zoning plans. 
Introduction 
 The economic circumstances of the over 560 tribes within the 
United State are as diverse as the people and cultures who comprise 
their membership.1 However, American Indians2 in the aggregate are 
                                                                                                                      
 
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2012–
2013. The author would like to express her gratitude to Professor Jonathan Witten for his 
support and advice throughout the creation of this Note. 
1 The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, The State 
of Native Nations: Conditions Under U.S Policies of Self-Determination 1 (2008); 
see David E. Wilkins & Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, American Indian Politics and 
the American Political System 138 (3d ed. 2011). 
2 The author recognizes that there is an ongoing controversy regarding the use of the 
terms American Indian versus Native American. There is no single term that is recognized 
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the most impoverished sector of people in the United States today, with 
over twenty-seven percent living below the poverty line.3 Many tribal 
governments have begun to implement a variety of economic develop-
ment initiatives in an attempt to address the dire economic situations 
on their reservations.4 However, the implementation of these initiatives 
is difficult on reservations where tribal governments lack authority over 
large percentages of the land within their reservation boundaries.5 
 Due to the tortured history of the U.S. government’s treatment of 
American Indians, the present reality of land ownership on reservations 
is complex.6 Throughout American history, the government created 
and dismantled the reservation structure several times.7 In 1887, Con-
gress passed the General Allotment Act, which dissolved the then-
existing reservation system and granted individual Indian heads of 
household separate parcels of land.8 The allotment policy resulted in 
loss of Indian lands en masse.9 White settlers purchased the land from 
American Indians who either could not afford the property taxes or 
were unfamiliar with the concepts of land ownership.10 Upon the rees-
tablishment of the reservation system in 1934, large amounts of land 
remained in the ownership of individuals who were not members of the 
tribes.11 The resulting checkerboard of land ownership between tribal 
land and nonmember land continues to have adverse effects on tribal 
governments today.12 
                                                                                                                      
by all members of the extremely diverse indigenous communities throughout the United 
States. The author chose the term American Indian or Indian due to its continued use by 
Indian organizations and the U.S. government. See Stephen L. Pevar, The Rights of 
Indians and Tribes: The Authoritative ACLU Guide to Indians and Tribal Rights 1 
n.* (3d ed. 2004); Wilkins & Stark, supra note 1, at xvii. 
3 Wilkins & Stark, supra note 1, at 136 tbl.6.1. 
4 Id. at 138–64 (explaining that tribes have begun to experience economic success 
through initiatives such as gaming, energy and mining, agriculture, water rights, and tour-
ism). 
5 Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Fu-
ture of American Indian Sovereignty 256–57 (1984); see Wilkins & Stark, supra note 
1, at 140. 
6 See Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 4.02[3], at 225 (Nell Jessup New-
ton ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2005) (1941) [hereinafter Cohen’s Handbook]. 
7 See infra notes 35–65 and accompanying text. 
8 General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388, 388 (1887) (repealed 1934); Pevar, 
supra note 2, at 8–9. 
9 See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.04, at 77–78. 
10 See Pevar, supra note 2, at 9, 168–69; S. Lyman Tyler, A History of Indian Policy 
96 (1973); Philip W. Dufford, Water for Non-Indians on the Reservations: Checkerboard Owner-
ship and Checkerboard Jurisdiction, 15 Gonz. L. Rev. 95, 96–97 (1979). 
11 Dufford, supra note 10, at 97. 
12 Id.; Deloria & Lytle, supra note 5. 
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 One of the most important duties of a local government is to pro-
tect and preserve the property values and public safety of the jurisdic-
tions over which they have authority.13 Starting in the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the powers to zone and create land-use controls be-
came important governmental tools to protect property and public 
health from nearby noxious uses.14 However, tribal governments have 
not been able to benefit fully from zoning plans due to their lack of 
authority over nonmember fee land.15 The modern Supreme Court has 
issued multiple opinions since 1978 affecting this authority of tribal 
governments over nonmembers and nonmember fee land.16 
 The modern Congress and executive branch primarily recognize 
that tribes retain their inherent sovereign authority over people and 
property within Indian Country unless Congress acts to limit the au-
thority.17 However, the Supreme Court has incrementally moved away 
from the recognition of inherent sovereignty by implementing limits 
on tribal authority over crimes committed by nonmembers and tribal 
authority to assert civil regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction over 
nonmembers.18 The Supreme Court first applied this theory of implicit 
divestiture to limit tribal civil regulatory authority in the landmark case 
Montana v. United States.19 This limitation of tribal sovereignty continues 
to severely impact tribal authority on reservations with large numbers 
of nonmembers and large amounts of nonmember fee land.20 This lim-
ited jurisdiction over large sections of land within reservations bounda-
                                                                                                                      
13 See 1 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson’s American Law of Zoning § 7.01, at 731 (4th 
ed. 1996). 
14 See Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 1.01, at 1–1 (5th ed. 2003); Young, su-
pra note 13. 
15 See Wilkins & Stark, supra note 1, at 140. “Fee land” refers to a fee simple interest 
in land defined as “[a]n interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed 
by law, endures until the current holder dies without heirs.” Black’s Law Dictionary 691 
(9th ed. 2009). 
16 See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008); 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 
(1993); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 
408 (1989); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Montana v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Res-
ervation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
17 John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen’s Handbook 
Cutting-Room Floor, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 731, 732 (2006). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 742 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 563–67). 
20 Deloria & Lytle, supra note 5, at 256–57. 
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ries significantly impairs the successful implementation of comprehen-
sive land-use planning.21 
 While the author agrees with many of the critiques of the implicit 
divestiture theory,22 this Note does not argue what the law should be 
regarding jurisdiction over nonmembers on reservations. The author 
recognizes the realities of the current make-up of the Supreme Court 
and the congressional impasse to accomplish substantive legislation, 
and instead takes a more pragmatic view of achieving tribal implemen-
tation of zoning plans on reservations. 
 Part I discusses the history of Indian Law and the circumstances 
that led to the creation of the current checkerboard of land owner-
ship.23 Part II evaluates the history and goals of zoning generally and 
the importance of comprehensive zoning plans on Indian reserva-
tions.24 Part III reviews the recent line of implicit divestiture cases and 
their impact on tribal authority over nonmembers and nonmember fee 
land.25 Lastly, Part IV suggests a method to gain zoning authority over 
nonmember fee land within the framework created by the Supreme 
Court in Montana v. United States.26 After close review of the recent Su-
preme Court cases,27 this Note offers advice and suggestions for tribes 
to enter into consensual relationships with nonmember fee land own-
ers in the creation of comprehensive zoning plans.28 Ideally, Congress 
would change the law and recognize that the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions are not in line with the foundational principles of Indian Law. 
However, tribal governments in the midst of protecting their natural 
resources and economic development plans cannot wait for congres-
sional action. 
                                                                                                                      
21 See Wilkins & Stark, supra note 1, at 140. 
22 See e.g., N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate Sources 
of Authority in Indian Country, 19 Am. Indian L. Rev. 353 (1994); Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit 
Divestiture and the Supreme Court’s (Re)Construction of the Indian Canons, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 623 
(2011); Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of 
Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L.J. 1 (1999); Joseph William Singer, Can-
ons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 641 
(2003); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court’s Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement 
Its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country, 36 Tulsa L.J. 267 (2000). 
23 See infra notes 29–97 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 98–148 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 149–225 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 226–306 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 230–272 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 273–306 and accompanying text. 
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I. Tribal Jurisdiction over Lands Within Reservation 
Boundaries 
 The success of any land use program hinges on the authority of 
the government to implement comprehensive land-use plans and zon-
ing regulations. Due to the historical evolution of American Indian 
land ownership, the question of tribal authority and jurisdiction over all 
lands within reservations is an extremely complex issue.29 Within the 
last few decades, Congress and the executive branch have generally 
recognized the principle that American Indian Tribes retain their “in-
herent sovereign authority over all persons, property, and events within 
Indian country unless Congress clearly and unambiguously acts to limit 
the exercise of that power.”30 However, the modern Supreme Court has 
placed significant limitations on tribal sovereignty in a variety of juris-
dictional realms including adjudicatory jurisdiction over both civil and 
criminal claims as well as regulatory jurisdiction.31 
 By creating these limitations without directly overturning tradi-
tional concepts of inherent tribal sovereignty, the Supreme Court cre-
ated what has come to be known as the “implicit divestiture” theory.32 
The implicit divestiture theory utilized by the Court to limit tribal juris-
diction over nonmembers deviates from the foundational principle of 
inherent sovereignty recognized within federal Indian law.33 These ju-
risdictional limitations on tribal regulatory authority become a huge 
barrier to land-use and zoning plans, especially on reservations with a 
large percentage of acreage held by nonmembers on fee land.34 
                                                                                                                      
29 See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 4.02[3][a], at 224–25 (explaining the the-
ory of implicit divestiture developed recently by the Court, which limits the inherent tribal 
sovereignty recognized by earlier decisions). See generally LaVelle, supra note 17 (examining 
in more detail the development of the implicit divestiture line of cases). 
30 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 4.02[3][a], at 224–25 (emphasis added); LaVelle, 
supra note 17 (emphasis added). 
31 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 4.02[3][a], at 224–25; LaVelle, supra note 17, at 
732–34. 
32 LaVelle, supra note 17, at 732–35 (discussing the origins and meaning of implicit di-
vestiture of tribal sovereignty and the “jurisdictional theory the term purportedly signi-
fies”); see Dean B. Suagee, The Supreme Court’s “Whack-a-Mole” Game Theory in Federal Indian 
Law, a Theory That Has No Place in the Realm of Environmental Law, 7 Great Plains Nat. 
Resources J. 90, 96–97, 106 (2002). 
33 LaVelle, supra note 17, at 732–35; see Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6. 
34 Deloria & Lytle, supra note 5; Carl G. Hakansson, Indian Land-Use Zoning Jurisdic-
tion: An Argument in Favor of Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-Member Fee Lands Within Reservation 
Boundaries, 73 N.D. L. Rev. 721, 737 (1997). 
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A. The Vacillating History of the Federal Government’s Indian Policy 
 An ugly saga of racism and paternalism created the jurisdictional 
issues confronting American Indian tribes today. In 1829, when Andrew 
Jackson became President, the U.S. government began the forced re-
moval of tribes located in the eastern states to the West.35 In 1830 Con-
gress passed the Indian Removal Act, giving the President the authority 
to relocate eastern tribes west of the Mississippi River.36 Although the 
United States had entered into treaties with the relocated tribes, it be-
came clear by the 1850s that the western movement of white settlers 
was causing conflicts with the Indian tribes.37 Due to the white desire to 
settle the West, the government violated their treaties and forced both 
the western tribes and the relocated eastern tribes onto reservations.38 
The federal government created and supervised schools on reserva-
tions and placed federal agents on the reservations to monitor tribal 
activity and promote the “civilization” of the tribal members.39 
 In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act, also known 
as the Dawes Act, to address extreme poverty on reservations and the 
failed goals of assimilation.40 The General Allotment Act authorized 
the executive branch to divide the reservations into individual parcels 
assigned to tribal heads of household.41 A provision within the General 
Allotment Act allowed the United States to hold the title for these new 
Indian allotments in trust for twenty-five years after the passage of the 
Act to avoid the immediate assessment of state property taxes.42 After 
this trust period, the Indian head of household could theoretically de-
cide to sell or hold onto their land.43 In actuality, once the period con-
                                                                                                                      
35 Pevar, supra note 2, at 7; Ronald N. Satz, American Indian Policy in the Jack-
sonian Era 9–12 (1975); II Robert W. Venables, American Indian History: Five Cen-
turies of Conflict & Coexistence, Confrontation, Adaptation & Assimilation, 
1783–Present 80–81 (2004). 
36 Indian Removal Act, ch. 148, § 1, 4 Stat. 411, 411–12 (1830); Pevar, supra note 2, at 
7. 
37 Pevar, supra note 2, at 7; see also Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.03[5], at 62–
64. 
38 See Arrell Morgan Gibson, The American Indian: Prehistory to the Present 
426–28 (1980); Pevar, supra note 2, at 7; Tyler, supra note 10, at 72–73. 
39 Pevar, supra note 2, at 7–8; Tyler, supra note 10, at 88–91. 
40 General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (the government’s allotment 
process ended with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461); see 
Gibson, supra note 38, at 489; Pevar, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
41 General Allotment Act § 1; Gibson, supra note 38, at 497–98; Pevar, supra note 2, at 
9; Venables, supra note 35, at 242–43. 
42 General Allotment Act § 5; Gibson, supra note 32, at 498; Pevar, supra note 2, at 8–
9. 
43 Pevar, supra note 2, at 9; Tyler, supra note 10. 
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trolled by the General Allotment Act ended, many impoverished heads 
of household could not pay the property taxes and lost their land to 
white settlers and foreclosure.44 In addition, the government consid-
ered all tribal land not allotted to individual Indians as surplus land 
and placed it in the public domain for sale to non-Indian settlers.45 
 The government had multiple policy goals in passing the General 
Allotment Act.46 Some white social reformers wanted to promote al-
lotment to bring Indians out of poverty through assimilation and land 
ownership.47 Social reformers hoped that private land ownership would 
enable the Indians to become farmers, overcome poverty, and better 
assimilate into American society.48 However, other policy-makers were 
more interested in introducing individual Indians to private property 
because they believed it would be easy to strip land title from people 
who had little experience with the notion of individual land owner-
ship.49 This policy goal came to fruition at the end of the twenty-five 
year trust period when many Indians were unable to pay their property 
taxes because they had not created profitable farm land.50 Therefore, 
they were forced to either sell their land to white settlers or face fore-
closure by the state.51 When Congress passed the General Allotment 
Act in 1887, American Indians held more than 138 million acres of 
land.52 By the time the federal government determined the allotment 
period was a failure, American Indians controlled only forty-eight mil-
lion acres.53 
 The sheer loss of land acreage was not the only negative result of 
the allotment period. In 1928, the Brookings Institute published the 
famous Meriam Report, which detailed the failure of the allotment pe-
riod and publicized the poverty, illness, hunger, and lack of education 
                                                                                                                      
44 General Allotment Act § 5; Pevar, supra note 2, at 9; Tyler, supra note 10. 
45 Gibson, supra note 38, at 498; Pevar, supra note 2, at 9. 
46 See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.04, at 79–80; Pevar, supra note 2, at 8; Ty-
ler, supra note 10, at 96–97. 
47 Pevar, supra note 2, at 8; Tyler, supra note 10, at 96–97; see Cohen’s Handbook, 
supra note 6, § 1.04, at 79–80. 
48 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.04, at 79–80; Pevar, supra note 2, at 8; Tyler, 
supra note 10, at 96–97. 
49 See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.04, at 79; Gibson, supra note 38, at 506–
07; Tyler, supra note 10, at 96. 
50 Pevar, supra note 2, at 9; see Tyler, supra note 10. 
51 Pevar, supra note 2, at 9; see Tyler, supra note 10. 
52 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.04, at 77–78. 
53 Id. § 1.04, at 78; see Gibson, supra note 38, at 507 (stating that after the repeal of the 
General Allotment Act in 1934, “Indians were in possession of less than one third of their 
original allotted lands”). 
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experienced by the American Indian population.54 Partially in response 
to the Meriam Report, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act 
of 1934 (IRA), also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act.55 The IRA rees-
tablished the legitimacy of tribal governments and discontinued the 
allotment of existing tribal land.56 Congress authorized the Depart-
ment of the Interior to create new reservations for tribes that had lost 
all of their land, add land to reservations that white ownership had not 
demolished completely, and restore tribal ownership to any surplus 
land that was not sold to white settlers.57 There were varied reactions to 
the IRA, with some tribes viewing the IRA as paternalistic because of 
Congress’ lack of consultation with tribal governments prior to its en-
actment as well as its requirement that the Secretary of the Interior ap-
prove tribal actions.58 The next administration’s Indian policy, however, 
soon made the IRA’s inadequacies seem minor in comparison.59 
 The federal government’s policy toward tribes changed dramati-
cally yet again when President Dwight Eisenhower took office in 1953.60 
The government’s policy became one of termination, not reorganiza-
tion.61 It terminated the trust relationship with tribes, ended federal 
support and benefits, and eliminated tribal governments and reserva-
tions.62 Similar to the allotment and assimilation period, the policy goal 
was to integrate American Indians into American society.63 The termina-
tion policy came to an end in 1968 when President Johnson’s admini-
stration reaffirmed tribal self-government and self-determination.64 
                                                                                                                      
 
54 Lewis Meriam, Institute for Government Research, The Problem of Indian 
Administration (F. W. Powell ed., 1928), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/resources/ 
meriam.htm (documenting the deplorable conditions on Indian reservations since the pas-
sage and implementation of the General Allotment Act); see also Pevar, supra note 2, at 9. 
55 Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576 § 1, 48 Stat. 984, 984 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006)); Pevar, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
56 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.05, at 84; Pevar, supra note 2, at 10; 
Venables, supra note 35, at 298–99. 
57 Pevar, supra note 2, at 10; Venables, supra note 35, at 298–99, 317. 
58 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.05, at 86; see Pevar, supra note 2, at 10; 
Venables, supra note 35, at 318. 
59 See Pevar, supra note 2, at 10–11. 
60 Pevar, supra note 2, at 11; see Tyler, supra note 10, at 172–73. 
61 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.06, at 94–95; Pevar, supra note 2, at 11; Ty-
ler, supra note 10, at 172–73; see, e.g., H. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 
(1953) (stating that its purpose was to make American Indians “subject to the same laws 
and entitled to the same privileges and responsibility as are applicable to other citizens of 
the United States, [and] to end their status as wards of the United States”). 
62 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.06, at 94–95; Pevar, supra note 2, at 11. 
63 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.06, at 94; Pevar, supra note 2, at 11. 
64 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.07, at 100; Pevar, supra note 2, at 12; see, e.g., 
Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat 588 (1953) (codified as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161–1162, 25 
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Congress and the executive branch have continued on this path of self-
determination through to the present.65 However, the federal govern-
ment’s schizophrenic Indian Policy has had long-lasting effects that con-
tinue to hinder tribal self-governance today. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Theory of Implicit Divestiture and the Checkerboard’s 
Effect on Tribal Sovereignty and Governance 
 Throughout this vacillating, destructive policy toward American 
Indians, one thing remained constant: those nonmembers who gained 
legal title during the allotment and termination periods were never 
forced to relinquish their title to the land.66 The IRA gave the Depart-
ment of the Interior the authority to reorganize and acquire title in 
trust for tribal governments.67 Those individuals who purchased title to 
the Indian allotments held their title in fee simple, however, and this 
fee land remains one of the primary types of land ownership on reser-
vations.68 Resulting reservation maps resemble checkerboards of vary-
ing types of land ownership, and, therefore, varied government juris-
diction.69 
 The jurisdictional problems created by this checkerboard should 
arguably have little effect on tribal governments because tribes tradi-
tionally have inherent civil regulatory authority over land within reser-
vation boundaries.70 The foundational principles of Indian law recog-
nize inherent tribal sovereign authority over property within Indian 
Country unless Congress specifically acts to limit that authority.71 These 
foundational principles developed through the constitution, treaties, 
congressional statutes, executive orders, regulations for bureaucratic 
agencies, and judicial interpretation and decisions.72 As put most suc-
cinctly by Felix Cohen in his landmark treatise on American Indian law: 
                                                                                                                      
U.S.C. §§ 1321–1122, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)) (expanding state criminal and civil jurisdic-
tion over tribes in California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin). 
65 Pevar, supra note 2, at 12. 
66 See Pevar, supra note 2, at 9, 168–69; Dufford, supra note 10, at 97–98. 
67 Suagee, supra note 32, at 95. 
68 Dufford, supra note 10, at 97–98. 
69 See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.04, at 78 n.505; Dufford, supra note 10, at 
97. 
70 LaVelle, supra note 17, at 743–44. 
71 Id. at 732. 
72 David E. Wilkins & K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Uneven Ground: American Indian 
Sovereignty and Federal Law 10 (2001). 
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Notwithstanding some recent departures, the whole course of 
judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal power is 
marked by adherence to three underlying fundamental prin-
ciples: (1) an Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all 
the inherent powers of any sovereign state; (2) a tribe’s pres-
ence within the territorial boundaries of the United States sub-
jects the tribe to federal legislative power and precludes the 
exercise of external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, such as 
its power to enter into treaties with foreign nations, that are 
inconsistent with the territorial sovereignty of the United 
States, but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of 
the tribe; and (3) inherent tribal powers are subject to qualifi-
cation by treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but 
except as thus expressly qualified, full powers of internal sov-
ereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly con-
stituted organs of government.73 
Judicial interpretation of these foundational principles of inherent 
tribal sovereignty has led to the development of many important doc-
trines of American Indian law, including the doctrine of discovery, trust 
doctrine, doctrine of plenary power, and reserved rights doctrine.74 
Chief Justice Marshall established many of these legal foundations in a 
series of three decisions from 1823 to 1832, within the Indian removal 
period.75 The first in the trilogy, Johnson v. McIntosh, confirmed the 
power of the federal government over Indian tribes.76 Under Justice 
Marshall’s “doctrine of discovery,” the Court held that while Indians 
retained a right of occupancy on their lands, the federal government 
held legal title based on the discovery and conquest of North America 
by European settlers.77 
 In the second case of the trilogy, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the 
Cherokee Nation filed suit to prevent the state of Georgia from enforc-
ing laws on tribal lands.78 The Court solidified the power of the federal 
government over Indian tribes by recognizing Indian tribes as “domes-
                                                                                                                      
73 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 4.02[1], at 221 (footnote omitted). 
74 See Wilkins & Lomawaima, supra note 72, at 10–11; Suagee, supra note 32, at 106–
07. 
75 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 
(1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
76 21 U.S. at 567–68. 
77 Id. at 563, 567–68; Pevar, supra note 2, at 24; Wilkins & Lomawaima, supra note 72, 
at 11. 
78 30 U.S. at 15; Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.03[4][a], at 49. 
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tic dependent nations.”79 Although the tribe was a “distinct political 
society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and 
governing itself,” the Court found it remained dependent on the fed-
eral government in a relationship that “resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian.”80 This ward-guardian relationship evolved into the modern 
day trust doctrine.81 The trust doctrine states that the federal govern-
ment must act in the best interest of tribes in the management of In-
dian trust lands, trust funds, and resources according to the federal 
government’s obligations as fiduciary.82 
 In the final case of the Marshall Trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia, two 
white missionaries appealed a Georgia state court indictment for entry 
onto Cherokee lands in violation of Georgia state law.83 The missionar-
ies argued that because the federal government recognized the Chero-
kee Nation as a sovereign in treaty relationships with the government, 
state law should have no authority on tribal lands.84 The Supreme 
Court held that the Cherokee Nation was a distinct political entity rec-
ognized by the federal government through statutes and treaties, and 
therefore the laws of Georgia had no force on tribal lands.85 However, 
while recognizing the distinct political nature of the tribe, Chief Justice 
Marshall also “implicitly endorsed” Congress’ plenary power over tribal 
governments.86 
 Under the reserved rights doctrine, tribal authority and rights were 
not granted but reserved when tribes gave authority over their lands to 
the federal government.87 Under this theory, a tribal government 
granted rights to the United States in the form of a treaty.88 If the tribe 
did not forfeit a specific right within the initial treaty with the United 
                                                                                                                      
79 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17; Deloria & Lytle, supra note 5, at 16–17. 
80 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16–17. 
81 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 5.04[4][a], at 419–20. 
82 Suagee, supra note 32, at 107. 
83 31 U.S. at 529–30; Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.03[4][a], at 49. 
84 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 529–30; Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.03[4][a], at 49–
50. 
85 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561; Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 1.03[4][a], at 50. 
86 Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Inter-
pretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 395 (1993) (discussing Worcester, 31 
U.S. at 557–62; Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588). The Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the doc-
trine of Congress’s plenary power over tribal governments in several later cases. Id. at 395 
n.59; see United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46–47 (1913); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 
U.S. 553, 565–67 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–85 (1886). 
87 Suagee, supra note 32, at 107. 
88 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 2.02[2], at 123. 
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States, it retained that right.89 While the rights and foundational princi-
ples have become integral aspects of Indian law, the plenary power of 
Congress and the “domestic dependent nations” status of tribes give 
Congress the power to continue to limit tribal sovereignty and rights.90 
Under the judicially created canons of construction, however, the courts 
must liberally construe any statute or treaty involving Indian Law in fa-
vor of Indians and how Indians would have understood them.91 
 Congress and the executive branch have confirmed these princi-
ples during the modern era by the continued recognition of inherent 
tribal sovereign authority.92 The modern Supreme Court, however, has 
“substantially curtailed tribal power over nonmembers, including both 
non-Indians and Indians who are not tribal members.”93 The Court has 
developed limitations on sovereignty that seriously impacts tribal gov-
ernments’ authority, even within reservation boundaries.94 The judi-
cially created limitations, also known as the implicit divestiture theory, 
taken in conjunction with the checkerboard of land ownership on 
many reservations, have made tribal governance and regulation ex-
tremely difficult.95 The pockets of nonmember fee land are not tribal 
land, and under the Supreme Court’s modern limitations on sovereign 
authority the tribes have very limited jurisdiction over those lands.96 
Although many commentators disagree with the Court’s implicit dives-
titure theory and the limitations it imposes on tribal sovereignty and 
self-governance, the Supreme Court continues to make rulings based 
on this narrow interpretation of sovereignty.97 Therefore, tribal gov-
                                                                                                                      
89 See id.; see also Wilkins & Lomawaima, supra note 72, at 119–20 (discussing the 
meaning of the reserved rights doctrine and the confusion over which rights are reserved 
under the doctrine). 
90 Frickey, supra note 86, at 395; see Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17; Cohen’s Handbook, 
supra note 6, § 4.02[1], at 221. 
91 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 6, § 2.02[1], at 119; Suagee, supra note 32, at 107. 
92 LaVelle, supra note 17. 
93 Singer, supra note 22, at 643. 
94 See LaVelle, supra note 17; Singer, supra note 22, at 643. 
95 See LaVelle, supra note 17; Jon Witten & Amanda Eckhoff, Controlling Land Use on the 
Reservation: The Powers of Tribes to Regulate Land Owned in Fee by Non-Indians, 56 Planning & 
Envtl. L. 3, 5 (2004). 
96 See infra notes 149–225 and accompanying text. 
97 See, e.g., Ennis, supra note 22, at 626 (arguing that the implicit divestiture case law 
has developed into an “anti-canon of Indian law”); Singer, supra note 22, at 643 (stating 
that the modern Supreme Court has led a “massive assault on tribal sovereignty” by limit-
ing tribal jurisdiction over non-members); Skibine, supra note 22, at 267 (stating that “the 
Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence in the field of federal Indian law has mystified 
both academics and practitioners”). 
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ernments must use the Court’s own rulings and language to determine 
how it can best assert jurisdiction over this nonmember fee land. 
II. The Need for Comprehensive Zoning Plans on Indian 
Reservations 
 The Supreme Court’s limitations on tribal jurisdiction over non-
member fee lands create conflicts between the zoning power of tribal 
governments and the municipalities that have jurisdiction over the 
nonmember fee land.98 In addition, the tribal jurisdictional limitations 
on zoning lead to the creation of “inconsistent and potentially incom-
patible zoning policies, and for all practical purposes . . . strip tribes of 
the power to protect the integrity of trust lands over which they enjoy 
unquestioned and exclusive authority.”99 The limitations on imple-
menting effective comprehensive zoning plans affect a range of tribal 
governance including the health and quality of the natural resources 
on the reservations.100 Due to the checkerboard of land ownership on 
many reservations, tribal governments cannot implement comprehen-
sive plans and zoning regulations over all of the land within reservation 
boundaries.101 Without the ability to implement these comprehensive 
plans, tribes may continue to face many of the economic problems that 
initially caused early cities to develop the first zoning laws. 
A. History of and Reasons for Zoning 
 In the United States, the trend toward comprehensive zoning be-
gan in larger urban areas where dense populations and severe blight 
threatened the health and safety of the city and its population.102 In 
1916, New York City was the first municipality to confront these prob-
lems through the development of a comprehensive zoning ordi-
nance.103 The use of comprehensive zoning quickly spread to other 
                                                                                                                      
98 See 5 Patrick J. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 33A.01, at 33A-4 to -5 
(LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2011). 
99 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 
408, 449 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment of No. 87–1622 and dissenting in 
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100 Witten & Eckhoff, supra note 95, at 3. 
101 See id. 
102 Young, supra note 13, § 1.14, at 21. 
103 City of New York, N.Y., Board of Estimate and Apportionment, Building Zone Reso-
lution, ( July 25, 1916), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/history_project/ 
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cities and into suburbs and small towns across the country.104 Municipal 
control over the use of land, density of development, height of build-
ings, and their physical placements allowed municipalities to control 
the current and future use and character of zoning districts within the 
city.105 This control allowed for preservation of the character of a 
neighborhood, protection of property values, and protection of public 
health and safety from negative externalities.106 
 In the 1920s, the U.S. Department of Commerce proposed the 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act and Standard City Planning Ena-
bling Act (together the “Standard Acts”) to the states, which established 
both guidelines and legal justifications for the zoning power of towns 
and cities.107 While many states and municipalities adopted legislation 
and ordinances similar to the Standard Acts, state courts issued varying 
opinions regarding whether comprehensive zoning was in fact constitu-
tional.108 These traditional Euclidian zoning schemes included the 
creation of a comprehensive plan, adoption of zoning ordinances as 
part of a public hearing process, and adoption of those ordinances for 
the long-term.109 In 1926, the issue of comprehensive zoning was 
brought before the U.S. Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Re-
alty Co.110 In Village of Euclid, the Court decided that the state’s police 
power gave them the constitutional authority to implement compre-
hensive zoning regulations.111 The Court declared these zoning regula-
tions constitutional when municipalities, as actors of the state, issued 
the zoning regulation as part of a larger plan that the municipality “as-
serted for the public welfare.”112 As zoning has become the backbone 
                                                                                                                      
104 William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its Exclusionary Effects, 
41 Urb. Stud. 317, 319 (2004). 
105 Peter W. Salsich, Jr. & Timothy J. Tryniecki, Land Use Regulation: A Legal 
Analysis & Practical Application of Land Use Law 1 (1998). 
106 See Mandelker, supra note 14; Young, supra note 13, § 7.01, at 730–31. 
107 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, A Standard City Planning Enabling Act (1928), avail-
able at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/CPEnabling%20Act1928.pdf; U.S. 
Dep’t of Commerce, A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (1926), available at http:// 
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Contract Nor Conditional Zoning, 33 Cap. U. L. Rev. 383, 386–88 (2004); see Jay Wickersham, 
Jane Jacobs’s Critique of Zoning: From Euclid to Portland and Beyond, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. 
Rev. 547, 548 n.2 (2001). 
110 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
111 Id. at 387–88; Green, supra note 109, at 385. 
112 Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387; Green, supra note 109, at 385. 
2013] Tribal Authority to Zone Nonmember Fee Land 173 
of most municipal land-use plans, the Euclidian model has confronted 
realistic hurdles and theoretical critiques.113 
 The debates over zoning became more prevalent during the 1960s 
and 1970s with new claims of discrimination resulting from exclusion-
ary zoning and private covenants.114 Although the Supreme Court out-
lawed the policy of using zoning and private covenants to explicitly seg-
regate races, municipalities began regulating the types and density of 
buildings to exclude minorities and low-income residents.115 During 
the same period, environmentalists realized that Euclidian zoning and 
the subsequent creation of suburbia also contributed to serious envi-
ronmental and growth management concerns.116 As concerns over the 
rigidity of traditional Euclidian zoning continued, municipalities began 
implementing mechanisms to address the rigidity of Euclidian com-
prehensive plans and ordinances.117 
 Modern comprehensive zoning ordinances continue to create 
single-use districts in the hopes of limiting the negative effects of dif-
ferent uses and protecting property values.118 These are important 
goals, but the adoption of more flexible zoning and land-use regula-
tion is beneficial for both economic development and environmental 
protection.119 Many municipalities have instituted modified zoning 
procedures that allow for flexibility in development and individual-
ized approaches to projects.120 Zoning ordinance amendments, spe-
cial-use permits, and zoning variances are all devices that municipali-
                                                                                                                      
113 See, e.g., William A. Fischel, The Economics of Zoning Laws: A Property 
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Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 337, 348–49 (2002). 
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ties can use to ensure some flexibility in the comprehensive zoning 
plan.121 As mixed-use and higher density developments become more 
popular in municipalities across the country, flexibility becomes more 
important in the zoning process.122 
 In addition, many states have created processes for municipalities 
to review land-use projects on a case-by-case basis and create rules spe-
cific to individual situations.123 The mechanisms, such as development 
agreements and conditional zoning, allow municipalities to bargain 
directly with developers and landowners.124 However, the flexibility cre-
ated by these bargaining mechanisms may run into legal problems if a 
court determines that the government has unconstitutionally con-
tracted away its police power.125 Many courts have found that develop-
ment agreements are constitutional when the city retains the govern-
mental power to end the development agreement and the bargained-
for action is in the best interest of public safety, health, or welfare.126 
Currently, hybrid zoning techniques are one of the main, albeit flawed, 
mechanisms of governmental land-use control in American cities.127 
B. The Importance of Zoning on Indian Reservations 
 Traditional and modern zoning ordinances have a variety of legiti-
mate purposes, including preservation of the character of a neighbor-
hood, protection of natural resources, protection of property values, 
and protection of public health and safety.128 For these objectives to be 
realized, the governmental entity must have authority over all land in-
cluded within its comprehensive zoning plan.129 However, the checker-
board of land ownership on many American Indian reservations ren-
ders comprehensive zoning plans and ordinances extremely difficult to 
develop and implement.130 Just as municipal zoning can ensure certain 
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protections for cities and towns, it can also help safeguard tribal eco-
nomic, natural, and cultural resources.131 
 The limitations on tribal zoning authority that result from the 
checkerboard of land ownership on many reservations are even more 
crippling because of the need for economic development projects on 
those reservations.132 Despite the recent increase in Indian gaming op-
erations, in 2006 the U.S. Census Bureau reported that twenty-seven 
percent of American Indians living in the United States were living in 
poverty.133 In fact, “Native Americans continue to rank at or near the 
bottom of nearly every social, health, and economic indicator.”134 
Tribes, however, have started to develop economic development pro-
grams to improve conditions on their reservations.135 Many tribes have 
recently had financial success in areas such as gaming, gas and oil, min-
ing, timber, manufacturing, water rights, fisheries and wildlife, grazing 
and livestock, agriculture, and tourism.136 
 With poverty rates trending at rates twice that of the general popu-
lation, it has become even more important for tribes to attract new 
businesses and improve the reservation economy, all while preserving 
their tribal culture and identity.137 However, without comprehensive 
zoning plans, the future use of land is unpredictable, natural and cul-
tural resources may remain unprotected, health and safety of all resi-
dents of the reservation may be at risk, and economic development 
plans may be severely impacted.138 In addition, Indian reservations are 
often located in areas of “scenic and historic interest” where natural re-
sources and the environment need to be protected.139 Furthermore, 
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tribes need the ability to implement zoning regulations to protect the 
practice of tribal culture and history.140 
 As discussed, many tribes are facing similar conditions of blight 
and the need for comprehensive zoning as those that confronted cities 
of the early twentieth century.141 Growing municipalities in the early 
twentieth century needed the prospective tool of zoning to provide ar-
eas of use conducive to the health and welfare of both residents and 
the economy.142 Tribes can learn from the challenges of the resulting 
restrictive zoning plans, and adopt tools that allow for more flexibility, 
such as development agreements and variances.143 As tribes continue to 
encourage economic development on reservations, they will need the 
ability to protect property values.144 However, without the jurisdiction 
to zone large parcels of land on their reservations, the goals of com-
prehensive zoning plans and ordinances can be difficult to achieve.145 
                                                                                                                     
 Both tribes and nonmember fee land owners are adversely affected 
when zoning cannot be implemented in a comprehensive manner.146 
Several Supreme Court decisions have limited the jurisdiction of tribes 
over nonmember fee land on reservations.147 These decisions have lim-
ited tribal authority to implement comprehensive zoning plans, espe-
cially on reservations with large amounts of nonmember fee land par-
cels.148 
III. The Supreme Court’s Limitation on Jurisdiction:  
From Oliphant to Plains Commerce Bank 
 The modern Supreme Court decisions of the William Rehnquist 
and John Roberts Courts give deference to nonmember interests over 
 
140 Brendale, 492 U.S. at 458 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); Graham, supra note 131; Rey-
nolds, supra note 139. 
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tion Environment After Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 
65 Wash. L. Rev. 417, 427–28 (1990). 
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tribal interests in a variety of jurisdictional disputes.149 The Court ini-
tially applied its theory of implicit divestiture in Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe by denying tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian crimes com-
mitted within the boundaries of the reservation.150 The Court found 
that tribal courts did not have jurisdiction to prosecute one non-Indian 
who had assaulted a tribal police officer and resisted arrest while on the 
reservation and another non-Indian who participated in a high-speed 
race on reservation roads that ended in a collision with a tribal police 
car.151 Furthermore, the Court found that the Suquamish courts could 
not try a non-Indian unless Congress explicitly authorized this type of 
jurisdiction.152 Commentators have criticized this Supreme Court deci-
sion as an affront to the “foundational principles of Indian law as well 
as contemporary congressional policy supporting tribal sovereignty and 
self-determination.”153 This limitation on criminal jurisdiction was 
merely the first step toward the Court’s further assault on tribal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians and nonmembers. 
 The Supreme Court issued its landmark decision limiting tribal civil 
jurisdiction over nonmember fee lands in Montana v. United States.154 In 
Montana, the Court reviewed the authority of the Crow Tribe to imple-
ment hunting and gaming regulations on fee land owned by nonmem-
bers within the reservation.155 The Court extended Oliphant’s general 
proposition that inherent sovereign authority does not extend to non-
members.156 The Court stated “the general proposition that the inher-
ent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities 
of nonmembers of the tribe.”157 Therefore, the Crow Tribe did not 
have the authority to regulate hunting and fishing on nonmember fee 
land.158 
 The Court also articulated two exceptions to this general proposi-
tion, stating that although tribal civil authority did not extend to non-
members generally, “Indian tribes [do] retain inherent sovereign 
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power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on 
their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.”159 The Court devel-
oped these two exceptions from previous decisions of the Court that 
granted tribal authority over nonmembers.160 
[First, a] tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or 
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consen-
sual relationships with the tribe or its members, through com-
mercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. . . . 
[Second, a] tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise 
civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands 
within its reservation when the conduct threatens or has some 
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or 
the health or welfare of the tribe.161 
At first glance these exceptions appear to allow the fundamental prin-
ciple of inherent sovereignty to govern in the majority of jurisdictional 
disputes on reservations.162 However, in its later decisions, the Supreme 
Court further limited the use of these exceptions and has not recon-
ciled the holding in Montana with the fundamental principles of Indian 
law.163 
 In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Band of the Yakima Indian Nation, 
the Court contemplated whether the Tribe could issue zoning ordi-
nances that regulated nonmember fee land on its reservation.164 The 
case involved two different parts of nonmember fee land within the 
reservation boundaries: a “closed” portion and an “open” portion.165 
The “closed” area of the reservation was primarily forest land that had 
been closed to the general public since 1972, which the Tribe only al-
lowed tribal members and tribal permittees to access.166 The “open” 
area was open to the general public and consisted of “rangeland, agri-
cultural land, and land used for residential and commercial develop-
ment.”167 
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 The Court did not issue a majority opinion regarding the Tribe’s 
authority over the nonmember fee land, but instead issued three sepa-
rate opinions, each with different reasoning on when and if the Tribe 
had zoning authority over the nonmember fee lands.168 Justice Byron 
White, joined by three other Justices, wrote an opinion that held the 
Tribe did not have authority to zone the fee lands in the reservation 
unless the regulation fit into one of the two exceptions of Montana.169 In 
his opinion, the zoning authority of the Yakima Tribe did not fit into 
either of the exceptions articulated in Montana, and therefore, he would 
have denied jurisdiction over both parcels of nonmember fee land be-
cause the zoning authority was not “demonstrably serious” enough to 
“imperil the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and 
welfare of the tribe.”170 
 Justices John Paul Stevens and Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in 
the denial of jurisdiction over nonmember fee land in the “open” area 
of the reservation.171 However, they approved tribal authority to zone 
the nonmember fee lands in the “closed” portion of the reservation.172 
The “open” portion of the land was utilized by both members and 
nonmembers and did not retain the Indian character necessary to jus-
tify exclusion.173 Justice Stevens distinguished the “closed” portion of 
the reservation because the Tribe retained the right to exclude non-
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J.). 
173 Id. at 444–45 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
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members from a small portion of the closed area and the tribe had the 
authority “to define the essential character of the area.”174 However, 
Justice Stevens did not consider the exceptions articulated in Montana, 
and therefore the three decisions did not truly answer the question of 
how to determine tribal authority over nonmember fee land.175 
 Finally, joined by two other Justices, Justice Harry Blackmun wrote 
an opinion concurring in the judgment with Justice Stevens’ opinion 
on the “closed” area and dissenting from Justice White’s opinion on the 
“open” area of the reservation.176 Applying the second exception of 
Montana, Justice Blackmun reasoned that zoning and the authority to 
regulate land use on the reservation were essential to the economic 
security and the health and welfare of the Tribe.177 However, Justice 
Blackmun’s opinion also articulated a higher standard for the second 
Montana exception, stating it “should be read, to recognize that tribes 
may regulate the on-reservation conduct of non-Indians whenever a 
significant tribal interest is threatened or directly affected.”178 The con-
cepts of “demonstrably serious” from Justice White’s opinion and “sig-
nificant tribal interest” from Justice Blackmun’s opinion both fore-
casted the high standard that the Court would apply to Montana’s 
second exception.179 
 In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court considered the adjudicatory 
power of the Tribal Court of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort 
Berthold Indian Reservation over nonmembers.180 Prior to the Strate 
decision, the Supreme Court had consistently found inherent tribal 
adjudicative authority over the actions of all Indians and non-Indians 
within reservations boundaries.181 However, in Strate the Court found 
                                                                                                                      
 
174 Id. at 438–40, 441, 444–45; LaVelle, supra note 17, at 745. 
175 See Brendale, 482 U.S. 444–45 ( Justice Stevens basing his decision on the power of 
tribes to exclude nonmembers from areas within the reservation); see LaVelle, supra note 
17, at 746. 
176 Brendale, 482 U.S. at 448 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); LaVelle, supra note 17, at 745–
46. 
177 Brendale, 482 U.S. at 458 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); LaVelle, supra note 17, at 746. 
178 Brendale, 482 U.S at 456–57 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (emphasis added). 
179 See id. at 431 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 457 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). 
180 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997). 
181 See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 11, 19–20 (1987) (requiring exhaus-
tion of the tribal court process where diversity of citizenship was the basis for federal juris-
diction); Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985) (finding 
that it is premature for a federal court to consider relief prior to the full exhaustion of the 
remedies available in a tribal court); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52 
(1978) (finding that tribal courts were the proper forum for claims under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 383 (1976) (affirming tribal court juris-
diction over an adoption proceeding where all parties were members of the tribe); Wil-
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that the Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction to try a non-Indian 
driver for injuries that occurred on a state highway that ran through 
reservation land.182 The state had previously obtained use of the public 
highway through a federally granted right-of-way over the reservation 
land.183 The Court equated this right-of-way status to the nonmember 
fee land considered in Montana.184 Based on this interpretation of the 
land ownership and the fact that the accident involved two non-
Indians, the Court found that the Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the civil tort action between the two drivers.185 
 After deciding that the grant of a federal right-of-way was equiva-
lent to nonmember fee land, the Court analyzed the claim through the 
two exceptions from Montana.186 The Tribe had hired the defendant 
corporation as a subcontractor to complete landscaping work on the 
reservation.187 The Court found, however, that the contract between 
the Tribe and the subcontractor did not fit within the “consensual rela-
tionship” exception of Montana because there was no connection be-
tween the contract and the negligent conduct of the defendant in the 
automobile accident.188 
 The Court also found that the second Montana exception did not 
apply because the tribal action was not in accord with the second ex-
ception’s “preface.”189 The court referenced the language from Mon-
tana that a tribe’s inherent sovereign authority does not extend “‘be-
yond what is necessary to promote self-government or to control 
internal relations.’”190 The Court found that highway safety and the 
tribal authority over highway accidents were not necessary to “preserve 
‘the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by 
them.’”191 The decision in Strate emphasized that the status of land 
                                                                                                                      
liams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (holding that tribal courts had jurisdiction over the 
conduct of both members and nonmembers on the reservation); see also LaVelle, supra 
note 17, at 752–54 (explaining this line of cases). 
182 Strate, 520 U.S. at 442. 
183 Id. at 454. 
184 See id. at 454–55. 
185 Id. at 442, 460; LaVelle, supra note 17, at 755–58. 
186 Strate, 520 U.S. at 456–459; LaVelle, supra note 17, at 757–58. 
187 Strate, 520 U.S. at 457. 
188 Id.; LaVelle, supra note 17, at 758. 
189 Strate, 520 U.S. at 459; LaVelle, supra note 17, at 758. 
190 Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 464); LaVelle, supra note 17, at 
758. 
191 Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (citing Williams, 358 U.S. at 220); LaVelle, supra note 17, at 
758. 
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would remain a “crucial threshold consideration.”192 Furthermore, it 
narrowed the applicability of both Montana exceptions in finding juris-
diction over nonmembers and nonmember land.193 
 In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, the Court ruled on the Navajo 
Nation’s inherent authority to impose a tax on non-Indian hotel 
guests.194 The Court reviewed a decision of the Navajo Nation Supreme 
Court, which upheld the Navajo Nation’s authority to impose a tax on 
non-Indian hotel guests staying at a hotel located on fee land within the 
Navajo Reservation.195 The Supreme Court applied Montana and held 
that the Tribe’s authority to tax these hotel guests did not fall under 
either exception to the rule.196 Therefore, the Court applied the “gen-
eral rule that Indian tribes lack civil authority over nonmembers on 
non-Indian fee land.”197 
 Under the first exception, the Court eschewed two arguments that 
the necessary consensual relationships existed.198 First, the Court re-
jected the argument that the Tribe was in a contractual relationship with 
the hotel to provide governmental services such as police and fire stat-
ing: “the exception would swallow the rule.”199 It also rejected the ar-
gument that the proprietor’s status as a licensed Indian trader estab-
lished a consensual relationship.200 The Court determined that this was 
not relevant to the determination of whether the necessary nexus ex-
isted between the tribal regulation and the consensual relationship with 
the hotel guests.201 It also found that the second Montana exception did 
not apply, stating “we fail to see how petitioner’s operation of a hotel on 
non-Indian fee land ‘threatens or has some direct effect on the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.’”202 
 In 2001, the Supreme Court’s decision in Nevada v. Hicks further 
narrowed the applicability of the Montana exceptions, in a tort claim 
brought by a tribal member against state police officers.203 State police 
officers allegedly took “extreme actions” in the execution of a search 
                                                                                                                      
192 LaVelle, supra note 17, at 759; see Strate, 520 U.S. at 458–59. 
193 Id. at 758–59; see Strate, 520 U.S. at 459. 
194 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001): LaVelle, supra note 17, at 747. 
195 Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 648–49. 
196 Id. at 654–59; LaVelle, supra note 17, at 750. 
197 Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 654; see LaVelle, supra note 17, at 750. 
198 Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 654–57. 
199 Id. at 655; LaVelle, supra note 17, at 750. 
200 Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 656–57; LaVelle. supra note 17, at 750. 
201 Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 656. 
202 Id. at 657 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566); LaVelle, supra note 17, at 750–51. 
203 533 U.S. 353, 355–58 (2001). 
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warrant on tribal land within the reservation.204 The state police offi-
cers came onto the reservation to execute a state search warrant relat-
ing to an alleged off-reservation game violation, an action tribal mem-
bers challenged.205 Continuing its reasoning in Strate, the Court again 
applied the general principle of Montana to tribal adjudicative jurisdic-
tion.206 The decision then expanded the limitations on tribal sover-
eignty, in part by finding that the ownership of the land at issue—in 
this case trust land—which had played such a vital role in its previous 
decisions utilizing the Montana rule, was “only one factor to consider in 
determining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is 
‘necessary to protect tribal-government or to control internal rela-
tions.’”207 Until this ruling, the Court had confined its application of 
the Montana rule to situations relating to nonmember activity on non-
member fee land or land it deemed to be similar.208 
 In its most recent application of Montana, the Court’s decision in 
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co. affirmed limita-
tions on tribal authority over a nonmember’s sale of fee land.209 An In-
dian couple who leased fee land on a reservation with the option to 
purchase brought a discrimination suit against the nonmember fee 
land owner, Plains Commerce Bank.210 The couple claimed the Bank 
discriminated against them when it sold the property to nonmembers 
of the Tribe on better terms than it had offered them.211 After the 
Tribal Courts ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, Plains Commerce Bank 
filed suit in federal District Court.212 The federal District Court applied 
the first exception under Montana and found that tribal jurisdiction was 
based on the consensual relationship between the plaintiffs and Plains 
                                                                                                                      
204 See id. at 356–57. 
205 Id. at 356. 
206 Id. at 357–58; LaVelle, supra note 17, at 759. 
207 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565). Therefore, despite the 
fact that the state police officers took these extreme actions on tribally-owned, trust land, 
the Court considered the member-status of the individual and concluded “that tribal au-
thority to regulate state officers in executing process related to the violation, off reserva-
tion, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government.” Id. at 364. 
208 LaVelle, supra note 17, at 759; see, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 648–49 (ana-
lyzing tribal authority to implement taxes on nonmember guests of a hotel on nonmember 
fee land); Strate, 520 U.S. at 442 (considering tribal adjudicative authority over a non-
Indian driver for injuries that occurred on a state-run right-of-way running through reser-
vation land). 
209 See 554 U.S. 316, 320 (2008). 
210 Id. at 320–21. 
211 Id. at 320. 
212 Id. at 320, 322–23. 
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Commerce Bank.213 The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the tribal 
courts had jurisdiction to regulate a corporation voluntarily doing 
business with tribal members.214 
 The Supreme Court reversed, holding the tribal court’s jurisdic-
tion did not extend to the non-Indian sale of fee land on the reserva-
tion.215 The Court relied on the general rule from Montana that “‘in-
herent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the 
activities of nonmembers of the tribe.’”216 The Court stated that Mon-
tana’s general rule “is particularly strong when the nonmember’s activ-
ity occurs on land owned in fee simple by non-Indians—what we have 
called ‘non-Indian fee land.’”217 The Court found that “once tribal land 
is converted into fee simple,” the regulation of the sale of this fee land 
falls outside of its authority.218 
 The Court reasoned that because the discrimination claim related 
only to the sale of fee land and not to the breach of contract or bad 
faith claims, the first Montana exception did not apply.219 Plains Com-
merce Bank could not expect that its general commercial dealings with 
the Indian couple would serve as the consensual relationship contem-
plated in the first exception, thereby preventing the sale of the bank’s 
land.220 Reviewing the four cases the Court initially cited in Montana 
supporting the first exception, and the post-Montana cases, the majority 
differentiated between the exception’s application to a sale of fee land 
and its application to “tribal regulation[s] of nonmember conduct inside 
the reservation that implicates the tribe’s sovereign interests.”221 The 
Court reasoned that the second Montana exception did not apply be-
cause it “stem[med] from the same sovereign interests that [gave] rise 
to the first [exception], interests that do not reach to regulating the 
sale of non-Indian fee land.”222 Therefore, the Court found that the 
sale of fee land to a third party does not “imperil the subsistence” of the 
tribal community.223 
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216 Id. at 328 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565). 
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 It is important to note that this long line of cases addressing tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmember fee land is a very recent phenomenon. 
Prior to the decisions in Oliphant and Montana, the foundational prin-
ciples of Indian law were still very much intact.224 The Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts, however, have continuously departed further from 
these foundational principles with each subsequent decision.225 As legal 
scholars debate the legitimacy of these decisions, tribal governments 
are left with the reality of governing territories over which they do not 
have complete control or authority. 
IV. Working Within the Supreme Court’s First Exception to 
Establish Comprehensive Zoning Plans 
 Although the modern Supreme Court’s theory of implicit divesti-
ture is a departure from the traditional notions of inherent tribal sov-
ereignty, the fact remains that tribes must work within this newly cre-
ated legal structure unless or until Congress acts to change the law.226 
Tribes with significant acreage of nonmember fee land on their reser-
vations must use the information within these decisions to design a 
workable method for implementing necessary comprehensive zoning 
regulations.227 With each decision of the Supreme Court, it becomes 
more apparent that the Court will not utilize the second exception 
from Montana v. United States to determine that a tribe retains authority 
over nonmember fee lands.228 Therefore, tribes must look to the first 
                                                                                                                      
 
224 See LaVelle, supra note 17, at 732–35. 
225 See id. at 732. 
226 See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997) (stating that without an ex-
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then “the exception would severely shrink the rule”); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & 
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 431–32 (1989) (opinion of White, J.) 
(discussing in the plurality opinion that the determination of tribal authority over the 
“closed” land was premature and finding that the lack of authority over the “open” land 
did not have enough of a “demonstrably serious” impact to qualify under the second ex-
ception); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (“[N]othing in this case sug-
186 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:159 
Montana exception and either develop consensual relationships with 
nonmember fee land owners directly or with abutting governments.229 
A. The Promise of the First Exception 
 Although the Supreme Court has not granted tribal jurisdiction 
under the first exception, the cases that discuss it provide helpful guid-
ance on what the Court considers “consensual relationships with the 
tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or 
other arrangements.”230 The Court’s introduction of the exception in 
Montana did not offer much direction except to state: “[t]o be sure, 
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of 
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-
Indian fee lands.”231 The Court then cited to four previous cases that fit 
within the consensual relationship exception.232 In Williams v. Lee, the 
Court found tribal jurisdiction over a contract dispute that arose out of 
the sale of goods between a nonmember and a member of the tribe on 
the reservation.233 The other three cases cited by the Montana Court 
related to a tribe’s authority to tax nonmember economic activity tak-
ing place within the boundaries of the reservation.234 
 In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court contemplated whether a 
highway accident between two nonmembers that occurred on a state 
highway running through the reservation qualified under the consen-
sual relationship exception.235 Although the Tribe had a consensual 
relationship with the employer of the defendant, the Court noted that 
the victim in the automobile accident was not a party to the contract 
and the Tribe was not involved in the accident.236 Therefore, the Court 
                                                                                                                      
gest[ed] that such non-Indian hunting and fishing so threaten the Tribe’s political or eco-
nomic security as to justify tribal regulation.”). 
229 See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. 
230 Id.; see Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. 316; Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. 645; Strate, 
520 U.S. 438. 
231 See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. 
232 Id. at 565–66 (citing Washington v. Confederate Tribes of the Colville Indian Reser-
vation, 447 U.S. 134, 152–54 (1980); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); Morris v. 
Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905)). 
233 358 U.S. at 217–18, 223. 
234 Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. at 152–54 (ruling that the tribe had the power to 
tax the sale of cigarettes to nonmembers when the transaction occurred on the reserva-
tion); Morris, 194 U.S. at 384–85, 393 (finding authority for the tribe to tax livestock owned 
by nonmembers on the reservation); Buster, 135 F. at 950 (recognizing the inherent tribal 
authority to tax nonmembers for the privilege of doing business on the reservation). 
235 520 U.S. at 456–57. 
236 Id. at 457. 
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found that this fact pattern “present[ed] no ‘consensual relationship’ 
of the qualifying kind.”237 
 In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, the Court considered whether the 
Navajo Nation’s taxation of nonmember hotel guests staying at a busi-
ness located on nonmember fee land fit within the consensual relation-
ship exception.238 The Nation argued that the hotel was in a consensual 
relationship with the Tribe in multiple ways.239 First, the Nation argued 
that the hotel received the benefit of public services—including police 
and fire—from the Tribe.240 The Court dismissed this argument stating 
that the relationship “must stem from ‘commercial dealing, contracts, 
leases, or other arrangements’ . . . and a nonmember’s actual or poten-
tial receipt of tribal police, fire, and medical services does not create 
the requisite connection.”241 The Nation also argued that the hotel’s 
status as an “Indian trader” and its holding of the necessary licenses to 
do business on the reservation evidenced a qualifying consensual rela-
tionship.242 The Court again dismissed this argument, stating that the 
first exception requires a “nexus” between the consensual relationship 
and the regulation the tribe claims authority to issue.243 As an “Indian 
trader,” the hotel did not consent to the taxation of its nonmember ho-
tel guests.244 Therefore, the Court concluded that a nonmember’s con-
sensual or contractual relationship with the Tribe in one substantive 
area does not mean that the Tribe has civil authority and jurisdiction 
over the entity in all respects.245 
 In Nevada v. Hicks, the Court saved its consideration of the first ex-
ception for a footnote.246 The Court reasoned that the “other ar-
rangement” language from the Montana exception refers to private 
consensual relationships only, and therefore the tribal court grant of a 
search warrant to state police officers did not qualify.247 In Plains Com-
merce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., the Court rejected the ap-
plicability of the first exception, reasoning that the Tribe lacked the 
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authority to regulate the sale of nonmember fee land.248 It distin-
guished the sale of nonmember land from the kind of nonmember ac-
tivities and conduct on nonmember fee land that the Court considered 
in earlier cases.249 The Court also stated, however, that the Bank’s gen-
eral business dealings did not satisfy the “commensurate consent” nec-
essary to allow tribal regulatory authority over nonmember activity and 
land not held by the tribe.250 
                                                                                                                     
 Despite the fact that recent decisions have not granted tribal au-
thority under the consensual relationship exception, the Court’s rea-
soning provides tribes with helpful guidance as to what types of con-
tracts and consensual relationships may satisfy the first exception. 
Within American jurisprudence, property ownership of land is treated 
as sacred,251 which may explain the recent Supreme Court decisions 
protecting the interests of nonmember fee land owners over tribes’ 
long-recognized inherent sovereignty.252 The Supreme Court previously 
remarked that the Indians’ “right of occupancy is considered as sacred 
as the fee simple of the whites.”253 In order to gain comprehensive zon-
ing authority, tribes and practitioners should utilize a construct of 
American jurisprudence that is “as sacred as the fee.”254 The creation of 
a contract under the first exception of Montana may offer the necessary 
legal construct because contracts, like property ownership, are revered 
within American jurisprudence.255 
B. The Supreme Court’s Bread Crumbs for the First Montana Exception 
 The Court’s reasoning in these cases gives tribal governments spe-
cific guidance for developing contracts with nonmember fee land own-
ers for the jurisdiction to implement comprehensive zoning plans.256 It 
may be tempting to look at the Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of 
the Yakima Indian Nation decision for its commentary on a tribe’s au-
thority to zone nonmember fee land, but the Court’s fractured opinion 
 
248 554 U.S. at 332, 334. 
249 Id. at 334. The Court reasoned that while previous cases had considered whether 
nonmember conduct and activity on nonmember fee land could be regulated by tribes, “in 
no case have we found that Montana authorized a tribe to regulate the sale of such land.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
250 See id. at 337–38. 
251 See Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746 (1835). 
252 See supra notes 149–225 and accompanying text. 
253 Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 746. 
254 See id. 
255 See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. 
256 See supra notes 230–255 and accompanying text. 
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provides more questions than answers.257 The Justices disagreed over 
whether tribal jurisdiction existed within the “open” and “closed” areas 
of the reservation and whether the Montana exceptions should apply at 
all.258 Subsequent opinions in this line of authority either barely refer-
enced the Brendale decision or narrowed the application of its reason-
ing.259 Though Justice Blackmun would have found tribal authority to 
zone under the second exception in his Brendale opinion, the lack of 
precedential value of this opinion, combined with the Court’s refusal to 
apply the second exception in subsequent decisions, should lead tribes 
to look to the first exception when creating comprehensive zoning 
plans.260 
 In creating the first exception, the Montana Court cited several 
early cases granting tribal civil authority over nonmembers who had 
entered into consensual relationships with the tribes.261 However, the 
Montana progeny developed further limitations to this tribal civil au-
thority beyond that discussed in Montana or the earlier decisions.262 
From the line of cases previously discussed, there are three extremely 
important lessons for tribes to consider when attempting to gain zoning 
authority through the first Montana exception. 
 First, the contract between the tribe and nonmember must specifi-
cally reference the intent and authority of the parties to apply the com-
prehensive zoning plan on nontribal land.263 The tribal zoning author-
ity sought must have a “nexus” to the content and substance of the 
contract that establishes the consensual relationship between the tribal 
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government and nonmember fee land owner.264 Second, under the 
reasoning in the Hicks footnote discussed above, the consensual rela-
tionship between the tribe and nonmember must be private in nature 
to qualify under the exception.265 Lastly, Justice Roberts’ discussion lim-
iting tribal regulation to nonmember conduct inside the reservation 
must be considered.266 Therefore, the language of the agreement be-
tween the tribe and the nonmember should reference and regulate the 
use and conduct of the nonmember rather than placing particular re-
straints on the fee land itself.267 The reasoning in Plains Commerce Bank 
indicates that nonmembers’ sale of land does not fall within the excep-
tion.268 Therefore, it is likely that these contracts could not run with the 
land.269 
 Tribes should use these three lessons to develop procedures to en-
ter into formal contracts with nonmember fee land owners for zoning 
purposes. Tribal authority to implement comprehensive zoning plans is 
essential to their ongoing attempts at economic development.270 Zon-
ing and land-use planning provide tribes the ability to protect the 
health and safety of the entire reservation, including persons residing 
on nonmember fee land.271 Conversely, the inability to implement com-
prehensive zoning ordinances negatively impacts both tribes and non-
member fee land owners.272 The first exception and the Court’s later-
developed parameters can aid tribes in the implementation of compre-
hensive zoning plans that include all land within the reservation, 
thereby reducing the negative effects of the checkerboard. 
C. Developing Consensual Agreements with Nonmember Fee Land Owners and 
Neighboring Governments 
 After careful review of this line of cases, tribes may still have two 
promising options to implement comprehensive zoning plans on reser-
vations that include nonmember-owned fee land. The tribes can either 
enter into consensual relationships with the local governments that 
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have jurisdiction over fee land,273 or they can enter into zoning con-
tracts directly with the nonmember fee land owners.274 Although the 
relationships between tribal governments and surrounding local and 
state entities historically have been contentious, policies related to land 
use and environmental concerns particularly lend themselves to coop-
erative arrangements between these governmental entities.275 Tribal 
governments enter into compacts or intergovernmental agreements in 
a range of policy areas.276 In situations where local governments are 
willing, these types of cooperative agreements may be an excellent op-
tion for tribes to gain zoning authority over nonmember fee lands.277 
 In addition to consensual relationships with abutting governments, 
tribes should also consider the creation of contracts between the tribe 
                                                                                                                      
273 See Jane Marx et al., Tribal Jurisdiction over Reservation Water Quality and Quantity, 43 
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118 (citing several examples of successful cooperative agreements). 
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and the nonmember fee land owner. As discussed, it is important to 
note that the consensual relationship must deal specifically with the 
authority to zone so that the contract has the proper “nexus” with the 
proposed land-use regulation.278 In addition, tribes must consider 
whether the tribal authority to enter into a zoning contract exists.279 
 The state’s constitutional police power is the source of municipali-
ties’ authority to zone the land within its boundaries.280 The municipal-
ity is thus restricted from entering into contracts with land owners or 
developers for changes to the comprehensive zoning plan, because it is 
unconstitutional to contract away the state’s police power.281 Tribal con-
tracts with nonmember fee land owners should not run into this consti-
tutional problem because the Supreme Court has determined that 
tribal governments do not have inherent authority over nonmember 
fee lands.282 Without this inherent authority, tribes are not actually con-
tracting away any of their powers.283 In fact, the tribe is gaining power 
over the fee land through this consensual relationship with the non-
member fee land owner.284 
 In developing these contracts, tribes must also consult 25 U.S.C. 
§ 81 to determine whether the contract needs to be approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior.285 This statute requires that any “agreement 
or contract with an Indian tribe that encumbers Indian lands for a pe-
riod of 7 or more years” must be approved by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior.286 Although the statute does not define “encumber,”287 the De-
partment of the Interior states that “[e]ncumber means to attach a 
claim, lien, charge, right of entry or liability to real property.”288 The 
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statute and regulations do not specifically mention whether entering 
into zoning contracts would be an “encumbrance.”289 It is likely that 
secretarial approval would not be required because the land in ques-
tion is not Indian land under the definition within the statute or regu-
lations.290 However, if the terms of the contract somehow involved the 
encumbrance of Indian lands in exchange for zoning authority, it is 
likely that secretarial approval would be required.291 Department of the 
Interior regulations state: “[w]ithin thirty days after receipt of final, 
executed documents, the Secretary will return such contracts and 
agreements with a statement explaining why Secretarial approval is not 
required.”292 Therefore, if a tribe or practitioner is unsure about the 
need for secretarial approval, they may submit the contract to the Sec-
retary for a determination as to whether approval is necessary.293 
 The last, and perhaps most important, consideration in developing 
these zoning contracts is how to persuade nonmember fee land owners 
to sign a contract providing tribes limited jurisdiction over their land. 
Just as with any consensual or bilateral agreement, a tribe must decide 
what they are willing to relinquish to nonmembers in exchange for the 
power to include their fee lands within comprehensive zoning plans. 
For those tribes with minimal fee land on their reservations, this kind 
of contract may not be worth these concessions.294 For tribal lands that 
have been severely fractured by the allotment period and want to im-
plement economic development projects, protect sacred and culturally 
important land, or natural resources, the relinquishing of some type of 
authority in exchange for contractual relationships for land-use plans 
may be well worth it.295 
 In developing these incentives, it is important to recognize that the 
types of nonmember entities who own this fee land and their use of the 
land varies greatly even within the same reservation.296 However, as the 
Atkinson Court recognized, there is one thing that these land owners 
have in common: they rely on the tribe and its infrastructure for a vari-
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ety of services.297 Despite the Court’s decision on tribal authority to tax 
nonmembers, tribal governments can still charge an appropriate fee 
for a rendered service such as utilities or emergency services.298 Al-
though the provision of services to nonmembers is a consensual, bilat-
eral agreement, the Court concluded that the actual or potential reli-
ance of a nonmember on the tribal police, fire, and other general 
services did not create the requisite consensual relationship contem-
plated by the Court in Montana.299 Therefore, tribal governments that 
charge fees for services should use the abatement of these types of fees 
as incentives to nonmembers to enter into zoning contracts. Both 
members and nonmembers benefit when the government is capable of 
implementing a comprehensive land-use plan that protects against 
nearby negative uses.300 
 Different tribes charge different types of fees, but the tribal gov-
ernments can use these different fee schedules to create a tiered incen-
tives approach. As noted in the Atkinson decision, the Navajo Nation 
charged the petitioner a flat fee and mileage fee for emergency medi-
cal service.301 Some tribes, including the Navajo Nation, charge differ-
ent fees based on membership status for entry into and use of parks 
and recreational areas.302 In addition, several tribes charge business 
licensing fees to operate on the reservation in which members and 
nonmembers are charged different rates.303 These fees are used as 
revenue sources for tribes across the country, but for tribes severely im-
pacted by the checkerboard effect of the allotment period, it may be 
worth using them as incentives instead.304 As tribes increase the imple-
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mentation of economic development plans, the ability to zone becomes 
an even more “fundamental method for regulating activities that may 
have detrimental effects” within the entire community.305 Not only will 
they be important to preserve the character of neighborhoods on res-
ervations, but they will also be vital in the protection of natural re-
sources and historic and cultural sites.306 
Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court’s recent holdings, its current composition, and 
Congress’ difficulty in accomplishing substantive legislation indicate 
that it is incredibly unlikely that the assault on tribal sovereignty will end 
in the near future. Tribes and tribal advocates must develop zoning 
policies and strategies that give tribes the ability to regulate potentially 
negative land uses throughout the entire reservation within the confines 
of this current climate. Implementing these zoning plans through con-
tracts with nonmember fee land owners or through cooperative agree-
ments with neighboring governments provides an opportunity for co-
operative negotiation that may avoid litigation. Furthermore, working 
within the framework of the Montana consensual relationship exception 
and the parameters of the subsequent decisions will give tribes more 
sure footing in the event they end up in litigation. The modern Su-
preme Court has departed from the foundational principles of retained 
rights and inherent sovereignty, and until tribes and their supporters 
can convince Congress to act, tribes must use the consensual relation-
ship exception to gain zoning authority over nonmembers and their 
land. 
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